Is it necessary for defense lawyers to believe that the clients they defend are innocent of the charges against them? Some legal scholars hold that lawyers* sole obligation is to provide the best defense they are capable of, claiming that in democratic societies all people accused of crimes are entitled to the best possible legal representation. They argue that lawyers have no right to judge defendants because it is the job of the courts to determine guilt or innocence and the job of the lawyer to represent the defendant before the court. They believe that the lawyer's responsibility is to state those facts that will assist each client's case, construct sound arguments based on these facts, and identify flaws in the arguments of opposing counsel. According to these scholars, the lawyer's role is not to express or act on personal opinions but to act as an advocate, saying only what defendants would say if they possessed the proper training or resources with which to represent themselves.
But such a position overlooks the fact that the defense lawyer's obligation is twofold: to the defendant, certainly, but no less so to the court and, by extension, to society. For this reason, lawyers, great as their obligation to defendants is, should not, as officers of the court, present to the court assertions that they know to be false. But by the same principle, lawyers who are convinced that their clients are guilty should not undertake to demonstrate their innocence. Guilty defendants should not be entitled to false or insincere representation. When lawyers know with certainty that a defendant is guilty, it is their duty not to deny this. Rather, they should appraise the case as much as possible in their client's favor, after giving due consideration to the facts on the other side, and then present any extenuating circumstances and argue for whatever degree of leniency in sentencing they sincerely believe is warranted. In cases where it is uncertain whether the client is guilty but the lawyer sincerely believes the client may well be innocent, the lawyer should of course try to prove that the client is innocent.
The lawyer's obligation to the court and to society also ultimately benefits the defendant, because the "best defense" can only truly be provided by an advocate who, after a careful analysis of the facts, is convinced of the merits of the case. The fact that every client is entitled to a defense does not mean that defense lawyers should take every case they are offered. Lawyers should not be mere mouthpieces for a defendant but instead advocates for the rights of the defendant given the facts of the case.
It can be inferred from the passage that the author holds that a defense attorney who argues in court that a client is innocent
A. should sincerely believe that the client may be innocent
B. would be right to do so even if the attorney knows that the client is actually guilty
C. is assuming the role of mouthpiece for the client
D. has favored the obligation to the client over that to society
E. has typically not researched the facts of the case thoroughly
Is it necessary for defense lawyers to believe that the clients they defend are innocent of the charges against them? Some legal scholars hold that lawyers* sole obligation is to provide the best defense they are capable of, claiming that in democratic societies all people accused of crimes are entitled to the best possible legal representation. They argue that lawyers have no right to judge defendants because it is the job of the courts to determine guilt or innocence and the job of the lawyer to represent the defendant before the court. They believe that the lawyer's responsibility is to state those facts that will assist each client's case, construct sound arguments based on these facts, and identify flaws in the arguments of opposing counsel. According to these scholars, the lawyer's role is not to express or act on personal opinions but to act as an advocate, saying only what defendants would say if they possessed the proper training or resources with which to represent themselves.
But such a position overlooks the fact that the defense lawyer's obligation is twofold: to the defendant, certainly, but no less so to the court and, by extension, to society. For this reason, lawyers, great as their obligation to defendants is, should not, as officers of the court, present to the court assertions that they know to be false. But by the same principle, lawyers who are convinced that their clients are guilty should not undertake to demonstrate their innocence. Guilty defendants should not be entitled to false or insincere representation. When lawyers know with certainty that a defendant is guilty, it is their duty not to deny this. Rather, they should appraise the case as much as possible in their client's favor, after giving due consideration to the facts on the other side, and then present any extenuating circumstances and argue for whatever degree of leniency in sentencing they sincerely believe is warranted. In cases where it is uncertain whether the client is guilty but the lawyer sincerely believes the client may well be innocent, the lawyer should of course try to prove that the client is innocent.
The lawyer's obligation to the court and to society also ultimately benefits the defendant, because the "best defense" can only truly be provided by an advocate who, after a careful analysis of the facts, is convinced of the merits of the case. The fact that every client is entitled to a defense does not mean that defense lawyers should take every case they are offered. Lawyers should not be mere mouthpieces for a defendant but instead advocates for the rights of the defendant given the facts of the case.
According to the passage, the legal scholars mentioned at the end of 1st paragraph believe that it is a defense lawyer's role to be
A. a source of legal information that can help a jury to reach decisions that are fair and equitable
B. a thorough investigator of all relevant evidence
C. a diligent representative of the client's position
D. a facilitator and expediter of the cause of justice
E. an energetic advocate of the client's right to legal representation
Is it necessary for defense lawyers to believe that the clients they defend are innocent of the charges against them? Some legal scholars hold that lawyers* sole obligation is to provide the best defense they are capable of, claiming that in democratic societies all people accused of crimes are entitled to the best possible legal representation. They argue that lawyers have no right to judge defendants because it is the job of the courts to determine guilt or innocence and the job of the lawyer to represent the defendant before the court. They believe that the lawyer's responsibility is to state those facts that will assist each client's case, construct sound arguments based on these facts, and identify flaws in the arguments of opposing counsel. According to these scholars, the lawyer's role is not to express or act on personal opinions but to act as an advocate, saying only what defendants would say if they possessed the proper training or resources with which to represent themselves.
But such a position overlooks the fact that the defense lawyer's obligation is twofold: to the defendant, certainly, but no less so to the court and, by extension, to society. For this reason, lawyers, great as their obligation to defendants is, should not, as officers of the court, present to the court assertions that they know to be false. But by the same principle, lawyers who are convinced that their clients are guilty should not undertake to demonstrate their innocence. Guilty defendants should not be entitled to false or insincere representation. When lawyers know with certainty that a defendant is guilty, it is their duty not to deny this. Rather, they should appraise the case as much as possible in their client's favor, after giving due consideration to the facts on the other side, and then present any extenuating circumstances and argue for whatever degree of leniency in sentencing they sincerely believe is warranted. In cases where it is uncertain whether the client is guilty but the lawyer sincerely believes the client may well be innocent, the lawyer should of course try to prove that the client is innocent.
The lawyer's obligation to the court and to society also ultimately benefits the defendant, because the "best defense" can only truly be provided by an advocate who, after a careful analysis of the facts, is convinced of the merits of the case. The fact that every client is entitled to a defense does not mean that defense lawyers should take every case they are offered. Lawyers should not be mere mouthpieces for a defendant but instead advocates for the rights of the defendant given the facts of the case.
Which one of the following sentences would most logically begin a paragraph immediately following the end of the passage?
A. In keeping with this role, defense lawyers should base their cases upon the foundations of honesty,
substantive accuracy, and selectivity.
B. Therefore, the practice of law remains morally dubious, in that misrepresentation may achieve acquittal for an attorney's client.
C. Consequently, the defendant's right to legal representation varies from case to case, depending on the severity of the alleged crime and the defense lawyer's personal interpretation of the case.
D. Thus, the lawyers' obligations are threefold to be faithful to the dictates of the court, society, and themselves by proving their professional worth in securing acquittal for the clients whom they represent.
E. Therefore, judges or other officials of the court should interrogate defense attorneys regarding any prior knowledge they may have of their clients' innocence or guilt.
Is it necessary for defense lawyers to believe that the clients they defend are innocent of the charges against them? Some legal scholars hold that lawyers* sole obligation is to provide the best defense they are capable of, claiming that in democratic societies all people accused of crimes are entitled to the best possible legal representation. They argue that lawyers have no right to judge defendants because it is the job of the courts to determine guilt or innocence and the job of the lawyer to represent the defendant before the court. They believe that the lawyer's responsibility is to state those facts that will assist each client's case, construct sound arguments based on these facts, and identify flaws in the arguments of opposing counsel. According to these scholars, the lawyer's role is not to express or act on personal opinions but to act as an advocate, saying only what defendants would say if they possessed the proper training or resources with which to represent themselves.
But such a position overlooks the fact that the defense lawyer's obligation is twofold: to the defendant, certainly, but no less so to the court and, by extension, to society. For this reason, lawyers, great as their obligation to defendants is, should not, as officers of the court, present to the court assertions that they know to be false. But by the same principle, lawyers who are convinced that their clients are guilty should not undertake to demonstrate their innocence. Guilty defendants should not be entitled to false or insincere representation. When lawyers know with certainty that a defendant is guilty, it is their duty not to deny this. Rather, they should appraise the case as much as possible in their client's favor, after giving due consideration to the facts on the other side, and then present any extenuating circumstances and argue for whatever degree of leniency in sentencing they sincerely believe is warranted. In cases where it is uncertain whether the client is guilty but the lawyer sincerely believes the client may well be innocent, the lawyer should of course try to prove that the client is innocent.
The lawyer's obligation to the court and to society also ultimately benefits the defendant, because the "best defense" can only truly be provided by an advocate who, after a careful analysis of the facts, is convinced of the merits of the case. The fact that every client is entitled to a defense does not mean that defense lawyers should take every case they are offered. Lawyers should not be mere mouthpieces for a defendant but instead advocates for the rights of the defendant given the facts of the case.
Which one of the following most accurately describes the author's attitude toward the twofold obligation introduced in 2nd paragraph?
A. confident that it enables defense lawyers to balance their competing responsibilities to the court and to society
B. certain that it prevents defense lawyers from representing clients whom they know to be guilty
C. satisfied that it helps defense lawyers to uncover the relevant facts of a case
D. pleased that it does not interfere with common defense strategies used by defense lawyers
E. convinced that it does not represent a conflict of interest for defense lawyers
Is it necessary for defense lawyers to believe that the clients they defend are innocent of the charges against them? Some legal scholars hold that lawyers* sole obligation is to provide the best defense they are capable of, claiming that in democratic societies all people accused of crimes are entitled to the best possible legal representation. They argue that lawyers have no right to judge defendants because it is the job of the courts to determine guilt or innocence and the job of the lawyer to represent the defendant before the court. They believe that the lawyer's responsibility is to state those facts that will assist each client's case, construct sound arguments based on these facts, and identify flaws in the arguments of opposing counsel. According to these scholars, the lawyer's role is not to express or act on personal opinions but to act as an advocate, saying only what defendants would say if they possessed the proper training or resources with which to represent themselves.
But such a position overlooks the fact that the defense lawyer's obligation is twofold: to the defendant, certainly, but no less so to the court and, by extension, to society. For this reason, lawyers, great as their obligation to defendants is, should not, as officers of the court, present to the court assertions that they know to be false. But by the same principle, lawyers who are convinced that their clients are guilty should not undertake to demonstrate their innocence. Guilty defendants should not be entitled to false or insincere representation. When lawyers know with certainty that a defendant is guilty, it is their duty not to deny this. Rather, they should appraise the case as much as possible in their client's favor, after giving due consideration to the facts on the other side, and then present any extenuating circumstances and argue for whatever degree of leniency in sentencing they sincerely believe is warranted. In cases where it is uncertain whether the client is guilty but the lawyer sincerely believes the client may well be innocent, the lawyer should of course try to prove that the client is innocent.
The lawyer's obligation to the court and to society also ultimately benefits the defendant, because the "best defense" can only truly be provided by an advocate who, after a careful analysis of the facts, is convinced of the merits of the case. The fact that every client is entitled to a defense does not mean that defense lawyers should take every case they are offered. Lawyers should not be mere mouthpieces for a defendant but instead advocates for the rights of the defendant given the facts of the case.
Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main idea of the passage?
A. Some legal scholars defend a morally questionable view that defense lawyers* sole obligation to their clients is to provide the best defense, while it is the court's job to determine guilt or innocence.
B. Defense lawyers should put aside personal judgments about their clients' guilt when determining how best to proceed when representing a client.
C. In a democracy, all persons accused of crimes have a right to an attorney who will state the facts, construct sound arguments, and identify flaws in the arguments of opposing counsel.
D. Lawyers should be mindful of their duty to society as well as to their clients and base the decision as to whether, and how, to defend a client on the facts of the case.
E. Defense attorneys are obligated to defend clients who request their professional services, especially when the attorney is absolutely convinced of the client's innocence.
Some philosophers find the traditional, subjective approach to studying the mind outdated and ineffectual. For them, the attempt to describe the sensation of pain or anger, for example, or the awareness that one is aware, has been surpassed by advances in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Scientists, they claim, do not concern themselves with how a phenomenon feels from the inside; instead of investigating private evidence perceivable only to a particular individual, scientists pursue hard data ?such as the study of how nerves transmit impulses to the brain ?which is externally observable and can be described without reference to any particular point of view. With respect to features of the universe such as those investigated by chemistry, biology, and physics, this objective approach has been remarkably successful in yielding knowledge. Why, these philosophers ask, should we suppose the mind to be any different?
But philosophers loyal to subjectivity are not persuaded by appeals to science when such appeals conflict with the data gathered by introspection. Knowledge, they argue, relies on the data of experience, which includes subjective experience. Why should philosophy ally itself with scientists who would reduce the sources of knowledge to only those data that can be discerned objectively?
On the face of it, it seems unlikely that these two approaches to studying the mind could be reconciled. Because philosophy, unlike science, does not progress inexorably toward a single truth, disputes concerning the nature of the mind are bound to continue. But what is particularly distressing about the present debate is that genuine communication between the two sides is virtually impossible. For reasoned discourse to occur, there must be shared assumptions or beliefs. Starting from radically divergent perspectives, subjectivists and objectivists lack a common context in which to consider evidence presented from each other's perspectives. The situation may be likened to a debate between adherents of different religions about the creation of the universe. While each religion may be confident that its cosmology is firmly grounded in its respective sacred text, there is little hope that conflicts between their competing cosmologies could be resolved by recourse to the texts alone. Only further investigation into the authority of the texts themselves would be sufficient. What would be required to resolve the debate between the philosophers of mind, then, is an investigation into the authority of their differing perspectives. How rational is it to take scientific description as the ideal way to understand the nature of consciousness? Conversely, how useful is it to rely solely on introspection for one's knowledge about the workings of the mind? Are there alternative ways of gaining such knowledge? In this debate, epistemology ?the study of knowledge ?may itself lead to the discovery of new forms of knowledge about how the mind works.
Which one of the following is most closely analogous to the debate described in the hypothetical example given by the author in the fourth paragraph?
A. a debate among investigators attempting to determine a criminal's identity when conflicting physical evidence is found at the crime scene
B. a debate among jurors attempting to determine which of two conflicting eyewitness accounts of an event is to be believed
C. a debate between two archaeologists about the meaning of certain written symbols when no evidence exists to verify either's claim
D. a debate between two museum curators about the value of a painting that shows clear signs of both genuineness and forgery
E. a debate between two historians who draw conflicting conclusions about the same event based on different types of historical data
Some philosophers find the traditional, subjective approach to studying the mind outdated and ineffectual. For them, the attempt to describe the sensation of pain or anger, for example, or the awareness that one is aware, has been surpassed by advances in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Scientists, they claim, do not concern themselves with how a phenomenon feels from the inside; instead of investigating private evidence perceivable only to a particular individual, scientists pursue hard data ?such as the study of how nerves transmit impulses to the brain ?which is externally observable and can be described without reference to any particular point of view. With respect to features of the universe such as those investigated by chemistry, biology, and physics, this objective approach has been remarkably successful in yielding knowledge. Why, these philosophers ask, should we suppose the mind to be any different?
But philosophers loyal to subjectivity are not persuaded by appeals to science when such appeals conflict with the data gathered by introspection. Knowledge, they argue, relies on the data of experience, which includes subjective experience. Why should philosophy ally itself with scientists who would reduce the sources of knowledge to only those data that can be discerned objectively?
On the face of it, it seems unlikely that these two approaches to studying the mind could be reconciled. Because philosophy, unlike science, does not progress inexorably toward a single truth, disputes concerning the nature of the mind are bound to continue. But what is particularly distressing about the present debate is that genuine communication between the two sides is virtually impossible. For reasoned discourse to occur, there must be shared assumptions or beliefs. Starting from radically divergent perspectives, subjectivists and objectivists lack a common context in which to consider evidence presented from each other's perspectives. The situation may be likened to a debate between adherents of different religions about the creation of the universe. While each religion may be confident that its cosmology is firmly grounded in its respective sacred text, there is little hope that conflicts between their competing cosmologies could be resolved by recourse to the texts alone. Only further investigation into the authority of the texts themselves would be sufficient.
What would be required to resolve the debate between the philosophers of mind, then, is an investigation into the authority of their differing perspectives. How rational is it to take scientific description as the ideal way to understand the nature of consciousness? Conversely, how useful is it to rely solely on introspection for one's knowledge about the workings of the mind? Are there alternative ways of gaining such knowledge? In this debate, epistemology ?the study of knowledge ?may itself lead to the discovery of new forms of knowledge about how the mind works.
Based on the passage, which one of the following is most clearly an instance of the objectivist approach to studying the mind?
A. collecting accounts of dreams given by subjects upon waking in order to better understand the nature of the subconscious
B. interviewing subjects during extremes of hot and cold weather in order to investigate a connection between weather and mood
C. recording subjects' evaluation of the stress they experienced while lecturing in order to determine how stress affects facility at public speaking
D. analyzing the amount of a certain chemical in subjects' bloodstreams in order to investigate a proposed link between the chemical and aggressive behavior
E. asking subjects to speak their thoughts aloud as they attempt to learn a new skill in order to test the relationship between mental understanding and physical performance
Some philosophers find the traditional, subjective approach to studying the mind outdated and ineffectual. For them, the attempt to describe the sensation of pain or anger, for example, or the awareness that one is aware, has been surpassed by advances in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Scientists, they claim, do not concern themselves with how a phenomenon feels from the inside; instead of investigating private evidence perceivable only to a particular individual, scientists pursue hard data ?such as the study of how nerves transmit impulses to the brain ?which is externally observable and can be described without reference to any particular point of view. With respect to features of the universe such as those investigated by chemistry, biology, and physics, this objective approach has been remarkably successful in yielding knowledge. Why, these philosophers ask, should we suppose the mind to be any different?
But philosophers loyal to subjectivity are not persuaded by appeals to science when such appeals conflict with the data gathered by introspection. Knowledge, they argue, relies on the data of experience, which includes subjective experience. Why should philosophy ally itself with scientists who would reduce the sources of knowledge to only those data that can be discerned objectively?
On the face of it, it seems unlikely that these two approaches to studying the mind could be reconciled. Because philosophy, unlike science, does not progress inexorably toward a single truth, disputes concerning the nature of the mind are bound to continue. But what is particularly distressing about the present debate is that genuine communication between the two sides is virtually impossible. For reasoned discourse to occur, there must be shared assumptions or beliefs. Starting from radically divergent perspectives, subjectivists and objectivists lack a common context in which to consider evidence presented from each other's perspectives. The situation may be likened to a debate between adherents of different religions about the creation of the universe. While each religion may be confident that its cosmology is firmly grounded in its respective sacred text, there is little hope that conflicts between their competing cosmologies could be resolved by recourse to the texts alone. Only further investigation into the authority of the texts themselves would be sufficient.
What would be required to resolve the debate between the philosophers of mind, then, is an investigation into the authority of their differing perspectives. How rational is it to take scientific description as the ideal way to understand the nature of consciousness? Conversely, how useful is it to rely solely on introspection for one's knowledge about the workings of the mind? Are there alternative ways of gaining such knowledge? In this debate, epistemology ?the study of knowledge ?may itself lead to the discovery of new forms of knowledge about how the mind works.
The author characterizes certain philosophers as "loyal to subjectivity" (line 20) for each of the following reasons EXCEPT:
A. These philosophers believe scientists should adopt the subjective approach when studying phenomena such as how nerves transmit impulses to the brain.
B. These philosophers favor subjective evidence about the mind over objective evidence about the mind when the two conflict.
C. These philosophers maintain that subjective experience is essential to the study of the mind.
D. These philosophers hold that objective evidence is only a part of the full range of experience.
E. These philosophers employ evidence that is available only to a particular individual.
Some philosophers find the traditional, subjective approach to studying the mind outdated and ineffectual. For them, the attempt to describe the sensation of pain or anger, for example, or the awareness that one is aware, has been surpassed by advances in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Scientists, they claim, do not concern themselves with how a phenomenon feels from the inside; instead of investigating private evidence perceivable only to a particular individual, scientists pursue hard data ?such as the study of how nerves transmit impulses to the brain ?which is externally observable and can be described without reference to any particular point of view. With respect to features of the universe such as those investigated by chemistry, biology, and physics, this objective approach has been remarkably successful in yielding knowledge. Why, these philosophers ask, should we suppose the mind to be any different?
But philosophers loyal to subjectivity are not persuaded by appeals to science when such appeals conflict with the data gathered by introspection. Knowledge, they argue, relies on the data of experience, which includes subjective experience. Why should philosophy ally itself with scientists who would reduce the sources of knowledge to only those data that can be discerned objectively?
On the face of it, it seems unlikely that these two approaches to studying the mind could be reconciled. Because philosophy, unlike science, does not progress inexorably toward a single truth, disputes concerning the nature of the mind are bound to continue. But what is particularly distressing about the present debate is that genuine communication between the two sides is virtually impossible. For reasoned discourse to occur, there must be shared assumptions or beliefs. Starting from radically divergent perspectives, subjectivists and objectivists lack a common context in which to consider evidence presented from each other's perspectives. The situation may be likened to a debate between adherents of different religions about the creation of the universe. While each religion may be confident that its cosmology is firmly grounded in its respective sacred text, there is little hope that conflicts between their competing cosmologies could be resolved by recourse to the texts alone. Only further investigation into the authority of the texts themselves would be sufficient.
What would be required to resolve the debate between the philosophers of mind, then, is an investigation into the authority of their differing perspectives. How rational is it to take scientific description as the ideal way to understand the nature of consciousness? Conversely, how useful is it to rely solely on introspection for one's knowledge about the workings of the mind? Are there alternative ways of gaining such knowledge? In this debate, epistemology ?the study of knowledge ?may itself lead to the discovery of new forms of knowledge about how the mind works.
According to the passage, subjectivists advance which one of the following claims to support their charge that objectivism is faulty?
A. Objectivism rests on evidence that conflicts with the data of introspection.
B. Objectivism restricts the kinds of experience from which philosophers may draw knowledge.
C. Objectivism relies on data that can be described and interpreted only by scientific specialists.
D. Objectivism provides no context in which to view scientific data as relevant to philosophical questions.
E. Objectivism concerns itself with questions that have not traditionally been part of philosophical inquiry.
Some philosophers find the traditional, subjective approach to studying the mind outdated and ineffectual. For them, the attempt to describe the sensation of pain or anger, for example, or the awareness that one is aware, has been surpassed by advances in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Scientists, they claim, do not concern themselves with how a phenomenon feels from the inside; instead of investigating private evidence perceivable only to a particular individual, scientists pursue hard data ?such as the study of how nerves transmit impulses to the brain ?which is externally observable and can be described without reference to any particular point of view. With respect to features of the universe such as those investigated by chemistry, biology, and physics, this objective approach has been remarkably successful in yielding knowledge. Why, these philosophers ask, should we suppose the mind to be any different?
But philosophers loyal to subjectivity are not persuaded by appeals to science when such appeals conflict with the data gathered by introspection. Knowledge, they argue, relies on the data of experience, which includes subjective experience. Why should philosophy ally itself with scientists who would reduce the sources of knowledge to only those data that can be discerned objectively?
On the face of it, it seems unlikely that these two approaches to studying the mind could be reconciled. Because philosophy, unlike science, does not progress inexorably toward a single truth, disputes concerning the nature of the mind are bound to continue. But what is particularly distressing about the present debate is that genuine communication between the two sides is virtually impossible. For reasoned discourse to occur, there must be shared assumptions or beliefs. Starting from radically divergent perspectives, subjectivists and objectivists lack a common context in which to consider evidence presented from each other's perspectives. The situation may be likened to a debate between adherents of different religions about the creation of the universe. While each religion may be confident that its cosmology is firmly grounded in its respective sacred text, there is little hope that conflicts between their competing cosmologies could be resolved by recourse to the texts alone. Only further investigation into the authority of the texts themselves would be sufficient.
What would be required to resolve the debate between the philosophers of mind, then, is an investigation into the authority of their differing perspectives. How rational is it to take scientific description as the ideal way to understand the nature of consciousness? Conversely, how useful is it to rely solely on introspection for one's knowledge about the workings of the mind? Are there alternative ways of gaining such knowledge? In this debate, epistemology ?the study of knowledge ?may itself lead to the discovery of new forms of knowledge about how the mind works.
The author's primary purpose in writing the passage is to
A. suggest that there might be valid aspects to both the subjective and the objective approaches to studying the mind
B. advocate a possible solution to the impasse undermining debate between subjectivists and objectivists
C. criticize subjectivist philosophers for failing to adopt a more scientific methodology
D. defend the subjective approach to studying the mind against the charges leveled against it by objectivists
E. evaluate the legitimacy of differing conceptions of evidence advocated by subjectivists and objectivists
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